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The Income Implications of Rising U.S. International Liabilities
Matthew Higgins, Thomas Klitgaard, and Cédric Tille
Although the United States has seen its net liabilities surge in recent years, its investment income
balance has remained positive—largely because U.S. firms operating abroad earn a higher rate
of return than do foreign firms operating here. The continuing buildup in liabilities, however,
should soon push the U.S. income balance below zero. In that event, net income flows will begin
to boost the nation’s current account deficit instead of reducing it.
Y
ears of large current account deficits have left
the United States with the world’s largest
stock of international liabilities.By the end of
2004,foreign net claims on the United States
amounted to $2.5 trillion,equivalent to 22 percent of U.S.
GDP.Normally, such a large net liability position would
require substantial investment income payments to the rest
of the world.Yet the reverse is true for the United States.In
2004, the nation earned $36 billion more on its foreign
assets than it paid out to service its foreign liabilities.
This surprising state of affairs stems from the fact that
the United States earns a higher rate of return on its large
stock of international assets than it pays out on its even
larger stock of international liabilities.In this edition of
Current Issues,we explore the sources of this return differ-
ential by looking at returns for various classes of assets
and liabilities.We find that there is barely any gap in rates
of return on assets and liabilities for equities,debt securi-
ties,and bank claims.In contrast,there is a substantial gap
in returns on foreign direct investment (FDI): U.S.firms
operating abroad are reportedly far more profitable than
foreign firms operating in the United States.
In considering the long-term outlook,we argue that net
investment income will not remain positive for much
longer,given the ongoing buildup in net foreign liabilities.
Moreover, a rise in U.S. and global interest rates from
recent low levels helps bring forward the date at which the
United States will have to make net income payouts.
These observations have important implications for the
sustainability of the U.S.current account deficit.At present,
positive net income receipts work to reduce the current
account deficit,acting as a partial offset to the large U.S.
trade deficit. A shift to growing net income payments
would mean that the U.S.trade deficit would have to narrow
merely for the current account deficit to stabilize.A shrink-
ing trade deficit,in turn,would mean that the United States
could no longer consume so much more than it produces.
The Evolution of U.S.Foreign Assets and Liabilities
A country’s current account balance is equal to the differ-
ence between domestic saving and domestic investment
spending.1 A country that saves more than it invests at
home sends its surplus abroad to purchase foreign assets.
A country that saves less than it invests finances the
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shortfall by issuing liabilities to foreign investors.A country’s
accumulated history of current account surpluses or deficits,
along with capital gains and losses on past investments,
determines its net international investment position.2
As an accounting identity,the current account balance is
also equal to the sum of the trade balance,net investment
income receipts,and net transfer payments such as workers’
remittances sent abroad. A positive net income position
pushes the current account balance toward surplus and a
negative income position tends to push it toward deficit.
A little more than two decades ago,the United States was
a significant international creditor,reflecting persistent cur-
rent account surpluses in the period after World War II.Since
then, persistent current account deficits have resulted in 
a significant buildup in net international liabilities.From
1982 to 2004,the U.S.net international investment position
shifted from a net asset position of $0.2 trillion to a net lia-
bility position of $2.5 trillion (Table 1).
While the United States has been building up a large net
liability position, both sides of its international balance
sheet have been growing rapidly.All told,U.S.international
assets rose from just $1.0 trillion in 1982 to $10.0 trillion in
2004.U.S.international liabilities rose from $0.7 trillion to
$12.5 trillion over the same period.
International assets and liabilities can be classified as fol-
lows: fixed-income securities (government or corporate
bonds),banking and other interest-paying claims,equities,
and foreign direct investment.A foreign direct investment
holding occurs when a single national investor has a stake of
more than 10 percent in a foreign business.
A look at the U.S.international balance sheet shows that
the United States has a sizable positive balance in FDI and
equity assets: together, these two categories of assets
exceeded liabilities by $1.2 trillion at the end of2004 (Table 1).
In contrast,the U.S.investment position for fixed-income
assets is sharply negative,with assets falling short of liabili-
ties by some $3.7 trillion.
Rates of Return on International Assets and Liabilities
International assets and liabilities generate income streams.
International investors receive coupon payments on fixed-
income securities,interest on bank debt,dividend payments
on equities,and profits on FDI holdings.For convenience,we
will refer to the ratio of income streams to the corresponding
asset values as rates of return. Taken literally, this phrase
would be somewhat misleading because the overall return to
international investors also depends on capital gains and
losses from changes in asset values. Note, however, that
changes in asset values do not generate investment income
flows across countries.
In 2004,the United States earned a rate ofreturn of4.5 per-
cent on its foreign asset holdings, while foreign investors
earned a rate of return of 3.2 percent on holdings in the
United States.3 This seemingly small gap in rates of return
was enough to leave the United States with positive net
income on its international portfolio,despite its large net 
liability position.Indeed,such differences in returns have
kept net investment income fairly stable in the last twenty




Billions of U.S.Dollars,End of Period
1982 2004 Change
Net position 236 -2,542 -2,778
Assets 961 9,973 9,012
Interest-sensitive 507 3,935 3,428
Fixed-income securities 67 959 892
Banking and other 440 2,976 2,536
Equities 17 2,520 2,503
Foreign direct investment 227 3,287 3,061
Miscellaneous 210 231 21
Liabilities 725 12,515 11,790
Interest-sensitive 473 7,550 7,076
Fixed-income securities 218 4,664 4,446
Banking and other 256 2,886 2,630
Equities 76 1,929 1,852
Foreign direct investment 130 2,687 2,557
Miscellaneous 45 350 305
Source:U.S.Department of Commerce,Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Notes:Miscellaneous assets include gold holdings and other assets of the U.S.
government.Miscellaneous liabilities consist largely of U.S.currency circulating
abroad.Foreign direct investment is calculated at market values. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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(left scale)To gain a better understanding of why the United States
has continued to earn positive net investment income,we
consider rates of return by asset class (see Box 1).To evalu-
ate rates of return, we combine all interest-paying debt
claims (including fixed-income securities and banking
claims) into a broader category we call interest-sensitive
assets.Our asset typology then matches the available invest-
ment receipt and payments data: interest, dividends on
equities,and profits on foreign business operations.
Naturally, rates of return on interest-sensitive assets
move up or down with interest rates.And for the United
States, returns on interest-sensitive assets and liabilities
tend to move closely together (Chart 2).One reason for the
like behavior is that a high fraction of U.S.assets and almost
all U.S.liabilities under this category are denominated in
dollars:4 returns thus move with dollar interest rates.
Another reason is that remaining U.S. interest-sensitive
assets are mostly held in Europe,where interest rates often
move with U.S.rates.
As for equities,rates of return (dividends over market
value) on assets and liabilities also tend to move in tandem
(Chart 3).Both have remained in a fairly narrow range of 1.5
to 3.5 percent over the last decade.
In sharp contrast,the rate of return on U.S.FDI assets has
consistently been higher than that on FDI liabilities (Chart 4).
Since 1982,the rate of return on FDI assets has,on average,
exceeded that on FDI liabilities by 5.6 percentage points,5
and not once during this period has the differential dropped
below 3.2 percentage points.Surprisingly,perhaps,there is
no consensus about the reason for this large and persistent
difference in rates of return (see Box 2).
Of course,total U.S.net investment income depends on
both the rate of return on the various asset classes and the 
distribution of the portfolio across assets.The large U.S.net
liability position in interest-sensitive assets leads to substan-
tial payouts under that category,despite the similarity of U.S.
and foreign interest rates (Chart 5).The superior rate ofreturn 
on FDI combined with a positive net asset position leads 
to substantial net FDI receipts.A smaller positive net position
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Box 1: Data Sources
In calculating investment position and rates of return, we
rely on data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
published in the Survey of Current Business. The values we
use for foreign direct investment and equities are those
reported in Table 1 of the International Investment
Position data. For our grouping of interest-rate-sensitive
assets held by U.S. investors, we use the sum of lines 9,
20, 22, and 23 in the same table. For our grouping of 
foreign-owned U.S. interest-rate-sensitive assets, we use
the sum of lines 26, 37, 39, 42, and 43 minus line 30. 
For income flows, we draw on Table 1 of the Inter-
national Transactions data. Foreign direct investment
flows are as reported. For non-FDI dividend flows, we
subtract the FDI distributed earnings reported in the
International Transactions Table 6a (line 3 plus line 68)
from the cross-border dividend flows reported in the
National Income and Product Accounts Table 4.1 (line 11
plus line 23). For interest-sensitive income, we subtract
non-FDI dividend flows from the sum of lines 15 and 16
and the sum of lines 32 and 33 in the International
Transactions Table 1.
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in equity assets combined with similar rates of return for
assets and liabilities leads to small net dividend receipts.
Together, the net receipts for FDI and equities in 2004
more than offset net payments on interest-sensitive liabili-
ties.As we will see,however,persistent U.S.current account
deficits and a rise in interest rates suggest that U.S. net
income receipts will not remain positive much longer,even if
the United States retains its overall rate-of-return advantage.
High U.S.Income:A Series of Fortunate Events
From 2000 to 2004,U.S.net income receipts edged up,from
$25 billion to $36 billion.Since the U.S.net liability position
worsened over the period,rising from $1.6 trillion to $2.5 tril-
lion, this increase in net income is surprising. However,
our analysis indicates that only a series of fortunate—and
possibly temporary—events prevented a substantial deteri-
oration in U.S.net income receipts.
Lower interest rates. The divergence in the trends in net
income and net position is especially striking for interest-
sensitive assets.From 2000 to 2004,net interest-sensitive 
liabilities more than doubled,from $1.6 trillion to $3.5 tril-
lion. Yet over the same period, net interest payments
increased at a much more modest rate, advancing from 
$83 billion to $113 billion.The reason that the United States
did not see a sharper rise in net interest payments is that U.S.
and foreign interest rates fell sharply from 2000 to 2002 and
remained relatively low for the next two years.Had interest
rates remained at their 2000 values,net interest payments
would have risen by another $59 billion in 2004,and total
U.S.net income would have been negative.
We calculate further that a uniform rise of 1 percentage
point across the yield curve in U.S.and foreign interest rates
would have subtracted $32 billion from U.S.net income in
2004.While we cannot predict how interest rates will behave
in the future,prevailing rates in 2004 were certainly at the
low end of historical norms.Moreover, the potential drag
from higher interest rates on net income is likely to grow
over time,since most of the ongoing buildup in U.S.net lia-
bilities is in interest-sensitive assets.
High returns from U.S.foreign operations.A second develop-
ment that has boosted U.S.net income receipts has been the
bigger increase in U.S.profits relative to foreign profits on
foreign direct investment (Chart 4).Since 2000,the U.S.rate
of return on FDI has risen from 5.4 percent to 8.6 percent,an
increase of3.2 percentage points;the foreign rate ofreturn on
FDI in the United States has risen from 2.0 percent to 4.3 per-
cent,an increase of 2.3 percentage points.Had rates of return
on FDI remained at their 2000 values, U.S. net income
receipts would have been $33 billion lower in 2004.
Looking ahead,we calculate that a relatively modest fall
in returns on FDI assets would have a substantial impact 
on net income.For example,if returns on FDI assets were to
fall 1 percentage point,to 7.6 percent,income receipts would
drop by $33 billion.Again,we cannot be certain how FDI
returns will behave in the years ahead,but a decline of 1 per-
centage point would simply bring the differential between
returns on FDI assets and liabilities near to the levels 
prevailing in the late 1990s.
A weaker dollar.A third recent development boosting U.S.
net income has been the depreciation of the dollar. On a
trade-weighted basis,the dollar declined 20 percent from
the end of 2000 to the end of 2004.A weaker dollar automat-
ically increases the value of income receipts denominated in
foreign currencies.(While U.S.liabilities are denominated
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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almost entirely in dollars,a large share of U.S.assets is held
in foreign currencies.) As a result, it leads directly to an
improvement in U.S.net income receipts.According to our
estimates,the decline in the dollar since 2000 added $27 bil-
lion to U.S.net income receipts in 2004.
Of course, these counterfactual calculations should be
interpreted with caution,because they rely on the unlikely
assumption that the accumulation of assets and liabilities
would have been the same under the rates of return prevail-
ing in 2000.Still,they illustrate how easily different paths for
rates of return and exchange rates might have pushed U.S.
net income below zero in 2004.
And indeed,the net income balance will likely soon turn
to deficit. Preliminary data for the first three quarters of
2005 show a surplus of only $4 billion,with higher interest
rates substantially increasing payments on the large stock of
interest-sensitive U.S.liabilities.
Consequences of Growing U.S.Net Liabilities
Developing a net liability position with respect to the rest of
the world can benefit a country by allowing it to maintain a
higher rate of investment spending than would be possible
by relying on domestic saving alone.But such a position also
creates an offsetting burden,by giving foreign investors a
The positive U.S. balance in net income owes much to the
higher reported profitability of U.S. firms operating abroad
relative to foreign firms operating in the United States. The
persistence of this rate-of-return advantage is a puzzle. If the
profitability of foreign direct investment in the United
States is so low, why do foreign investors continue placing
substantial sums in the U.S. market?
Seeking to shed light on the puzzle, we examine FDI
returns by industry and country. (For details, see Appendix
Tables A1 and A2 in the online version of this article, at
<http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/
ci11-12.html>.) Unfortunately, our analysis deepens the
puzzle rather than solves it: with few exceptions, the U.S.
rate of return advantage holds across industries and countries.
The available industry breakdown shows rates of return
based on historical cost valuations for FDI in the manufac-
turing, wholesale trade, information, and financial indus-
tries. With the lone exception of the transportation equip-
ment industry, foreign firms in the United States have much
lower rates of return than U.S. firms operating abroad. The
best return recorded for a foreign operation in the United
States, 12.0 percent for wholesale trade in 2004, just
matches the average return across all U.S. operations abroad.
A similar pattern is evident in the country breakdown.
European and Japanese investors earn low rates of return in
the United States, while returns for U.S. foreign operations
are relatively high in all the major industrial countries. For
example, one of the best returns in the United States,
9.7 percent for U.K. firms, is significantly below the 11.7 per-
cent average rate of return for U.S. firms abroad.
Similarly, for U.S. operations abroad, the weakest returns
in our sample—6.9 percent and 9.2 percent, respectively,
for U.S. firms in Germany and the United Kingdom—still
exceed the 6.6 percent average return on foreign direct
investment in the United States.
Other possible explanations for the higher reported prof-
itability of U.S. firms’ foreign operations are as follows:
● U.S. firms, on average, may simply be more efficient
than foreign companies. There is some indirect evidence
for this view: U.S. business sector output has consistently
grown faster than business sector output in Europe or
Japan, despite a much lower rate of business investment.
However, the limited data that can be used to compare
corporate profits across countries actually place the prof-
itability of U.S. firms at about the advanced-economy
average.
● U.S. investors may have been particularly successful at
investing in well-governed firms, and may have abstained
from momentum trading. Some recent research (Thomas,
Warnock, and Wongswan 2004) supports this view. 
● Foreign companies operating in the United States tend
to be newer than U.S. firms operating abroad. To the
extent that this is the case, foreign firms have had less
time to work through initial start-up costs and to
develop the market power in the United States that
would boost their profits. Some research supports this
argument (Laster and McCauley 1994). However, the
explanation has been advanced for many years and
should become increasingly less plausible as the accu-
mulated stock of FDI assets in the United States
matures. 
● Foreign companies operating in the United States may
face more competitive pressure than U.S. firms operating
abroad and thus have lower margins. 
● Differences in tax treatment may induce foreign firms to
attribute profits on operations in the United States to the
home country or a third country and induce U.S. firms to
attribute profits on U.S. operations to activity abroad.
However, most studies at best provide mixed evidence
for this claim (Laster and McCauley 1994).
Whatever their source, the high reported profits of 
U.S. firms operating abroad provide a welcome offset to net
interest payments in supporting U.S. net investment income.
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claim on future national income. In the United States, a
favorable gap between rates of return on assets and liabili-
ties has thus far obscured this consequence.However,the
ongoing buildup in U.S.net liabilities to the rest of the world
means that the United States is likely to begin making net
payouts in the near future.
When this occurs,net income flows will begin to add to
the U.S.current account deficit instead of working to reduce
it.As the net income deficit grows,the U.S.trade deficit must
narrow merely to prevent the current account deficit from
increasing. Achieving an actual reduction in the current
account deficit would require the trade deficit to decline
even further.
To illustrate how the adjustment process might unfold,
we consider three alternative scenarios.All three scenarios
rely on the simplifying assumption that future current
account deficits are financed entirely through liability
issuance,with U.S.foreign assets remaining fixed.To pro-
vide a point of reference,the first scenario simply projects
recent trends forward by assuming that 
● the U.S.current account deficit remains at 6 percent of
GDP,close to its current value,
● U.S.nominal GDP growth proceeds at 5 percent per year,
close to its recent average,and
● exchange rates and rates of return on U.S.foreign assets
and liabilities remain unchanged.
These assumptions are,of course,counterfactual.Changes
in exchange rates,rates of return,and U.S.gross foreign assets
will no doubt materially affect the adjustment process.Still,
our calculations provide a useful benchmark.
Under this scenario,U.S.net foreign liabilities as a per-
centage of GDP would rise from 22 percent—their level 
in 2004—to 65 percent by 2015 and would continue to 
climb higher in subsequent decades (Table 2,Scenario 1).6
Payments on the growing U.S.net liability position would
near 1.2 percent of GDP by 2015.To accommodate the grow-
ing net income payments (under our assumption that the
current account deficit remains constant as a share of GDP),
the U.S.trade deficit would have to decline from 5 percent of
GDP in 2004 to roughly 4 percent by 2015.
It might seem implausible that the actual U.S.net liability
position could grow as large as this scenario implies.With
this in mind, we proceed to our second scenario, which
assumes that the U.S. current account deficit declines
smoothly to 2.5 percent of GDP by 2015. The remaining
assumptions are the same as in the first scenario.Under the
new scenario,U.S.net liabilities would approach 50 percent
of GDP by 2015 (Table 2,Scenario 2).The U.S.trade deficit
would have to fall to 1 percent of GDP by 2015 to accommo-
date income payments to foreign investors of slightly below 
1 percent of GDP.
A rise in the rate ofreturn the United States pays on foreign
liabilities would require still larger adjustments.In our third
scenario,we assume that the rate of return on U.S.liabilities
rises to equal the current rate ofreturn on U.S.assets while the
U.S.current account deficit,as in the second scenario,declines
smoothly to 2.5 percent of GDP by 2015. Under this last 
scenario,the United States would need to run a small trade
surplus by 2015 to make room for income payments to foreign
investors of slightly more than 2 percent of GDP.
An increase in net payments means that a reduction in
the U.S. current account deficit would entail significant
changes in the structure of the U.S.economy.At present,U.S.
imports are roughly 50 percent larger than U.S.exports,at
16.0 percent and 10.5 percent of GDP, respectively. As a
result, exports have to grow much faster than imports to
bring the trade deficit down.
Suppose,for example,that import growth through 2015
matches the 5 percent annual rate we have assumed for nomi-
nal GDP, keeping the ratio of imports to GDP constant.
Exports would have to grow almost twice as fast,at a 9 percent
6
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Net position -21.7 -65.0 -89.0
Trade balance -5.3 -4.2 -3.2
Net income receipts 0.3 -1.2 -2.2
Scenario 2
Net position -21.7 -48.3 -49.9
Trade balance -5.3 -1.1 -0.8
Net income receipts 0.3 -0.8 -1.1
Scenario 3
Net position -21.7 -48.3 -49.9
Trade balance -5.3 0.2 0.3
Net income receipts 0.3 -2.1 -2.2
Source:Authors’calculations.
Notes:Scenario 1:Current account constant at 6 percent of GDP;rates of return at
2004 values.Scenario 2:Current account deficit falls to 2.5 percent of GDP by 2015;
rates of return at 2004 values.Scenario 3:Current account deficit falls to 2.5 percent
of GDP by 2015;rate of return on liabilities rises to meet 2004 rate of return on
assets.All scenarios assume that nominal GDP growth is constant at 5 percent and
that net transfer payments abroad are constant at 0.6 percent of GDP.annual rate,to cut the trade deficit to 1 percent of GDP,as
envisaged in our second scenario.Export production would
then represent 15 percent of U.S. GDP, a fairly dramatic
change in the composition of output for a ten-year period.
These are counterfactual simulations, not forecasts.
However,the simulations highlight an important point:even
if the U.S.current account deficit narrows substantially in
the years ahead,income payments to foreign investors are
likely to take up a growing fraction of U.S. income. The
impact of higher income payments on U.S. consumers
depends on how the associated foreign capital inflow is
deployed.To the extent that the inflow goes to finance pro-
ductive investments,future U.S.national income should be
higher,even net of income payments to foreign investors.To
the extent that the inflow goes to finance current consump-
tion or the government budget deficit,future U.S.income
will be lower,net of those income payments.
Conclusion 
Large, ongoing current account deficits are leading to a
steady buildup in U.S.net liabilities to the rest of the world.
Thus far,the longer term implications of the buildup in net
liabilities for U.S.net investment income have been masked
by the superior rate of return the United States earns on FDI
assets and the recent drop in global interest rates.
However, continued large current account deficits are
likely to push the U.S.income balance below zero in the not
too distant future.As a result,the United States will need to
effect a sharper narrowing in its trade deficit to achieve any
given narrowing in its current account deficit. Such an
adjustment could be challenging for the United States,which
now imports vastly more than it exports.
Notes
1. Higgins and Klitgaard (1998) discuss the accounting relationships linking
savings, investment, the current account balance, the trade balance, and net
income flows.
2. A number of recent papers discuss the role of capital gains and losses in
determining a country’s international investment position. See, for example,
Gourinchas and Rey (2005), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003), and Tille (2003).
3. In calculating returns, we divide income by asset or liability values meas-
ured at the end of the previous year.
4. See Table 8 in “Report on U.S. Portfolio Holdings of Foreign Securities,”
available at <http://www.treas.gov/tic/shc2003r.pdf>.
5. Profits on FDI do not actually have to cross national borders to be counted
as investment income: total profits include reinvested earnings as well as repa-
triated earnings.
6. Over the very long run, with a constant current account deficit of cas a ratio
to GDP and constant nominal GDP growth at the rate g, the ratio of net liabili-
ties to GDP eventually stabilizes at c(1+g)/g. In the first scenario, net liabilities
plateau at roughly 125 percent of GDP.
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Table A1
Rate of Return on Foreign Direct Investment,by Industry
Percent
Payments:Rate Earned Receipts:Rate Earned 
by Foreign-Owned Firms  by U.S.-Owned Firms
Operating in the United States Operating Abroad
All industries 6.6 11.7
Manufacturing 7.4 12.9
Chemicals 6.6 14.3
Computer and electric products 5.4 11.7
Transportation equipment 8.2 9.5
Machinery 2.9 13.6
Wholesale trade 12.0 19.8
Information 4.7 18.5
Depository institutions 5.3 5.2
Other financial institutions 4.6 8.3
Professional services 7.6 16.4
Source:U.S.Department of Commerce,Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Note:Returns are foreign direct investment income flows in 2004 divided by 
foreign direct investment position on a historical cost basis at the end of 2003.
Table A2
Rate of Return on Foreign Direct Investment,by Country
Percent
Payments:Rate Earned Receipts:Rate Earned
by Foreign-Owned Firms by U.S.-Owned Firms 
Operating in the United States Operating Abroad













Asia and Pacific 8.5 15.8
Australia 13.4 11.4
Hong Kong 5.7 14.0
Japan 7.7 16.6
Source:U.S.Department of Commerce,Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Note:Returns are foreign direct investment income flows in 2004 divided by 
foreign direct investment position on a historical cost basis at the end of 2003.